Israel and the Axis of Resistance
Israel and the Axis of Resistance
Welcome to Some Thoughts About!
STA is intended to be pretty broad-scoped: the idea is to carve out space where I can share columnist-like theories, speculations, and opinions (about all sorts of things), alongside raw, objective-as-possible analysis that’s similar to what I aim for with my podcast, Let’s Know Things.
(More about me and what I’m intending this project to be on the About page…STA is very much a work in progress).
That said, let’s jump in with a look at what’s happening in the Middle East—specifically how Israel seems to be rapidly reorienting the region and its power dynamics, and what might happen next in that regard.
Here’s an AI-generated conversational podcast about this piece, if you want to listen to a surprisingly decent ~15 minute, talkpod-style summary:
The Anniversary
Tomorrow is October 7, marking the one year anniversary of Hamas’ tactically successful, strategically maybe less so surprise attack on Israel.
This attack was complex and brazen, and it seems to have flown under the radar of Israel’s vaunted intelligence service (with a few notable exceptions), and the combination of thousands of rockets and thousands of incursions through more than 100 defensive barriers resulted in the deaths of close to 1,200 people in Israel, with another ~250 taken hostage.
Hamas has been running the Gaza Strip since 2007 when they booted another Palestinian group from power. Though their specific stances have fluctuated over the decades, they’ve pretty much always been opposed to the existence of Israel, and have dedicated themselves to establishing a formally recognized Palestinian state (the territory where that state might theoretically be established someday—the Gaza Strip and the West Bank—is currently occupied by Israel).
Hamas’ attack was supported by a slew of other, smaller Palestinian paramilitary groups, and other members of the so-called Axis of Resistance: a group primarily composed of Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen (though there are also substantial militias in Syria and Iraq that are sometimes included under this organizational label).
Hezbollah, which controls and governs parts of Lebanon and operates the closest thing to a nation state-scale military in the Axis, launched a bunch of rockets at Israel across its shared border shortly after the attack on Oct 7.
The Houthis began attacking cargo ships traversing a bottle-neck passage leading into the Red Sea around this time, as well, targeting more than 80 such vessels with missiles and drones over the past year, sinking two of them and seizing another (these efforts have severely snarled shipborne traffic headed to and from the Suez Canal, which in turn has severely disrupted global shipping).
As soon as Israel was able to dislodge the invaders and get its military in order following the Oct 7 attack, it started retaliating against Hamas’ infrastructure and soldiery in Gaza, and in the past year it has damaged or demolished nearly two-thirds of all structures in the Strip (ostensibly in the pursuit of Hamas’ leadership, and in order to destroy the many tunnels and other bases they’ve built within and under civilian areas).
Up until recently, Israel was mostly bogged-down in Gaza, committing most of its forces to taking out Hamas, and only tit-for-tatting when one of the other Axis members attacked them (which was fairly often in the case of Hezbollah, but less so, directly at least, in the case of Iran and the Houthis).
Those tit-for-tat strikes have been of a kind with what we’ve seen erupt between these groups in recent decades. There have been periodic upsets to that dynamic (like Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 2006), but the (simmering, mutually hateful) status quo has basically simmered for years, largely unchanged.
Following that attack on Oct 7, though, Israel seemed to decide that these default dynamics were no longer serving them, so they moved in to wipe out Hamas, whatever the consequences (and there were quite a few—key among them the tens of thousands of Gazan civilian deaths).
The Invasion of Lebanon
That disruption of the status quo was made even more overt when Israel’s military and intelligence services enacted what’s being seen as a stunning (and on many levels, terrifying) attack against Hezbollah’s leadership, using proxy companies to sell them pagers, radios, and other equipment containing small explosives, which Israel detonated on September 17 and 18, killing and injuring a huge swathe of the organization’s leadership (who were issued those devices), all at once.
This was likely meant to help its intelligence service (Mossad) regain its credibility following its failure to detect and prevent the Oct 7 attacks, and in that regard it seems to have been a success.
Israel’s military then assassinated Hezbollah’s leader, who was reportedly buried deep in a bunker in a residential area (so that took some doing and caused a lot of collateral damage), and they seem to have, separately, taken out his next in command, as well.
There have been reports that this sequence of attacks (pager-bombs included) might have originally been meant to serve as a first-strike in a new, formal conflict with Hezbollah, but that they had to move sooner than anticipated due to suspicions amongst their targets.
Whether that’s true or not, what we’re seeing now is a pseudo-invasion of Lebanon: Israel’s forces massing at the border and launching sorties into the southern portion of the country (which is controlled by Hezbollah), taking out infrastructure and engaging in firefights with Hezbollah soldiers, alongside Israeli air strikes against targets further and further north into Lebanese territory.
From a piece on this sequence of events:
The extraordinary damage the IDF has inflicted on Hezbollah has indeed left the organization reeling. The list of top Hezbollah commanders killed in the past fortnight reads like a Who’s Who of Shi’ite militants and is being added to daily.
“Almost the entirety of the group’s senior leadership, political and military, along with thousands of members and mid-level commanders, has been assassinated, eliminated, or rendered combat-ineffective—not to mention that the Israel Defense Forces have destroyed large quantities of strategic munitions that could have threatened Israeli cities and targets,” said Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib, an analyst at the Atlantic Council.
“The region might be witnessing the beginning of the end of Iran’s axis of resistance,” he added.
And here’s what the invasion has looked like, so far:
The scope and scale the damage in Lebanon has already been substantial, and about a million people (out of a population of a little more than 5 million) have been displaced.
Netanyahu’s Ambitions
Israel has already lost some soldiers as part of this new invasion (though a lot less than Hezbollah has lost), and that sort of thing tends to be politically unpopular for democracies—though those successful first-strikes on Hezbollah (especially taking out their leader) seems to have rallied Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s numbers (and those of his party), despite continued, widespread opposition to his leadership within Israel.
Netanyahu’s poll numbers are climbing, his party would win an outright majority if an election were held today (for the first time since the Oct 7 attacks), and there seems to be significant support for attacking Hezbollah in particular (90% of Israeli Jews support it, according to one poll).
There are concerns by some that Lebanon—because of its terrain and because of how well-established Hezbollah is thereabouts—could become a quagmire for Israeli forces if they overcommit to the area.
From a piece addressing that concern through the lens of what happened in 1982, when Israel launched what was meant to be a quick little invasion of Lebanon, but then became an 18 year occupation:
Former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, a fierce Netanyahu critic, warned: “You know how invasions start. I’m not certain that you know how it will develop and how it may then end. The previous experience we had with a ground operation in Lebanon lasted 18 years. It was a total failure, I mean, strategic failure. I don’t understand what’s precisely the strategy here.”
“I think that Bibi [Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu] is getting carried away and he’s being swept by the events and is losing proportion,” he added in an interview with POLITICO.
Also from that piece:
Olmert, the Netanyahu critic, told POLITICO no one should doubt that Israeli forces will be able to push to the Litani but stressed “it may cost us quite a lot in terms of human lives.”
And then once that’s accomplished “what is to stop them coming back to the border? Are we going to remain there forever in order to protect southern Israel? Are they going to contemplate building settlements in the south of Lebanon in the meantime? I mean, what exactly do they want to do?”
The Ambition
Part of the ambition (on Netanyahu and his government’s part) seems to be taking out the biggest whammy Iran has had against Israel for decades: the threat that if they do anything Iran (or its allies) don’t like, Hezbollah’s state-scale military will launch gobs of rockets at their cities.
Following Israel’s attacks on their leadership, though, Hezbollah had the chance to launch a credible counterattack, signaling that they’re still in the game, ready to fight—but they didn’t do that, and that failure to maintain their cross-border tit-for-tat at the expected scale may have suggested to Israel that the group is, for the moment at least, weak and vulnerable.
The Iran Question
This (perceived and seemingly practical) diminishment of Hezbollah may represent a serious concern for Iran, which has been supporting them in various ways for a while, now, and which has leaned on them (and their other Axis proxies) to keep Israel off-balance, so that they never feel confident striking Iran directly (lest they get hit back in a similar fashion, from one of many possible angles)—what’s been called a “no peace, no war” strategy.
Iran has a solid conventional fighting force when it comes to ground battles, but because there are two countries between them and Israel, it’s likely any direct conflict between these nations would be a mostly airborne affair. And because Iran doesn’t really have an air force to speak of, and Israel’s air and anti-air capabilities (especially when backed by its allies) are top-notch, that conflict would be seriously biased in Israel’s favor.
From a recent piece on this subject:
While Iran is a much bigger country than Israel, and would be a formidable foe in a land war, the current conflict isn’t a replay of the grinding Iraq-Iran war of the 1980s. Israel is located more than 550 miles and two countries away from Iran. Any direct confrontation between the two would be primarily an air and missile battle where Tehran, with its rudimentary air force and outdated air defenses, is severely outmatched.
“Iran’s air defenses and missiles will run out at some point. Iran doesn’t have the defense industrial capability to churn out missiles at the rate that would be needed to keep the war going, and it won’t be able to buy these missiles elsewhere because the only country that might transfer them, Russia, is using these missiles for its own war in Ukraine,” said Esfandyar Batmanghelidj, chief executive of the Bourse and Bazaar think tank.
Where Things Stand Now
So the state of play at the moment is this:
Israel has knocked out not just most of Hamas’ capabilities, but most of the buildings—all types of building—in Gaza.
Israel has, incredibly rapidly, launched several successful decapitation attacks against Hezbollah, the sharpest sword in Iran’s proxy arsenal, and is now launching a minor invasion (which could scale-up, if history is any predictor of such things) into Lebanon to hit more Hezbollah targets.
The Houthis were recently hit by an Israeli airstrike (which was possibly meant to send a message to Iran: “You’re far away, but we can hit you”), and the US launched airstrikes against them, as well.
Iran launched around 180 ballistic missiles at Israel in response to their assassination of Hezbollah’s leader, and though some hit (mostly military) targets, the damage was fairly moderate, which raises questions about the value of Iran’s long-range arsenal in a potential, real-deal conflict with Israel.
And it’s increasingly looking like Israel might be angling for a fight with Iran, despite widespread worries about a regional conflict.
And there is quite a lot of concern about this potentiality:
The US is concerned (about the civilian death toll, at least).
India is concerned.
China is deeply concerned.
The G7 is concerned.
The IMF is concerned (about the economic implications).
The oil industry is maybe less concerned than you might expect (this is partly because of a shift in global oil production away from Middle East—which only produces about a third of global supply as of 2024—though it’s also maybe because of the seeming lack of unity in OPEC+).
But despite all those concerns, and despite the Israeli economy’s wartime suffering, and despite the many, many civilian deaths (and deteriorating overall humanitarian situation in Gaza) and abundant claims of war crimes committed by Israeli forces in Gaza, Israel’s government really doesn’t seem to want a peace deal.
This is where that aforementioned (seeming) angling for a fight with Iran becomes the most overt:
Even before Israel launched what it described as a “limited” ground offensive into Lebanon Tuesday, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made clear that his ultimate target in the regional power shift is to undermine the authority of Tehran’s clerical leadership, defanging the Iranians who are the bankrollers, trainers and supposed protectors of both Hamas in Gaza and the Lebanese Shi’ite militia Hezbollah.
In an address in English on Monday, Netanyahu promised the “noble Persian people” that the day when they were free of rule by “tyrants” and could have peace with Israel would come “a lot sooner than people think.”
“There is nowhere in the Middle East Israel cannot reach,” he warned ominously.
In other words, they’re looking to instigate regime change in Iran:
Shortly after the missile barrage, Benjamin Netanyahu publicly announced that Iran had made a “big mistake” and would “pay for it.” Israel’s dedicated X account echoed this threat in Persian. Former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett called on Netanyahu to attack Iran’s nuclear and energy sites, claiming that this could lead Iranians to rise up and bring down their regime at last. Israel has had no better chance in half a century to change the region fundamentally, Bennett said.
US Backing
The US government, which has been toeing a somewhat incoherent, zigzaggy line on Israel and their activities in Gaza, has restated its position that civilian lives must be protected, but it actually seems to be largely on board with what’s happening in Lebanon, and with what could happen in Iran (compared to their official statements about what’s been happening in Gaza, at least).
More specifically, the US government seems to support a quick flurry of attacks that could serve to reorient the region in Israel’s (and to a similar degree, the US’s) favor, despite at one point seeming to want Israel to completely pull back, US President Biden telling Netanyahu to “take the win”:
Senior White House figures privately told Israel that the U.S. would support its decision to ramp up military pressure against Hezbollah—even as the Biden administration publicly urged the Israeli government in recent weeks to curtail its strikes, according to American and Israeli officials.
Israel may, then, be opting for a “peace is best achieved through victory” approach to its conflict with Iran, and it may be hoping to achieve this by disassembling Iran’s Axis of Resistance, then provoking Iran into doing something that grants Israel a casus belli against them: ideally something that pulls the US in as at least a partial participant, on their side.
That latter component of the plan would be tricky to accomplish if Israel is the clear aggressor, but if they keep clobbering Iran’s proxies, that could trigger an overstep on Iran’s part (or something that could be framed as an overstep), as Iran will be compelled to make gesture revenge-attacks against Israel to defend their credibility.
One of these revenge-attacks could then serve as justification for broader, more direct attacks against Iran.
What Happens Next
The big concern amongst outside entities hoping to avoid a Middle East-wide conflict is that Israel will (in response to Iran’s launching of those ~180 missiles against them following their assassination of Hezbollah’s leader) launch an escalatory attack against Iran—maybe targeting their oil infrastructure, nuclear capabilities, or civilian infrastructure—rather than something more equivalent and tit-for-tat-like.
A larger, regional conflict is generally considered to be not good because of the damage that would be done in terms of lost lives and treasure, but also because it could spiral into a larger conflict, pulling in players like the US, China, and Russia (alongside regional powers like the Saudis and Turkey), and that, in turn, could spark a far different sort of (world) war.
In the face of such a potentiality, there’s also a chance that Iran might panic, scuttle its seeming openness to another nuclear deal with the West, and instead rush toward building a nuclear weapon: something they’re close to being able to do, though one weapon isn’t the same as a nuclear arsenal, and building (not to mention testing) such weapons would take a while, and would be nearly impossible to accomplish without being noticed and stopped (concerns about a scramble for nukes could be used by Israel to justify a full-fledged attack on Iran, by the way, whether they’re actually making such an effort or not—“Iraq has weapons of mass destruction, so we must attack them”-style).
Whatever the scale and nature of their attack, Israel’s success in Iran would likely rely (at least in part) on American backing. And while the US government has continued to signal that it’s not thrilled with Netanyahu’s actions (especially in regards to civilian casualties), it’s also continued to megaphone its essentially unquestioning support of Israel and its security, and it doesn’t seem opposed to the idea of this kind of realignment—which would be further locked-in if Iran were to be properly humbled, their government maybe even (as a stretch-goal) overthrown.
Netanyahu (for a variety of reasons) seems to be keen to keep this conflict going as long as possible, leveraging the momentum it seems to have right now to tackle (or even take out) some of its long-time, regional antagonists.
And especially if he can get the US on board, it’s looking increasingly likely he’ll channel that wave of success and support into a more direct attack (or campaign of attacks) on Iran, almost certainly targeting their military and oil infrastructure, and possibly hobbling their nuclear assets and civilian infrastructure, as well—those latter targets meant to increase existing frictions between Iranians and their government, with the intention of sparking revolts and maybe even revolution.
There are a lot of ways this could blow up in Israel’s face, as the disruption of that tit-for-tat balance it had with its nearby enemies means they can hit Israel harder, too, and defending against that possibility will spread Israel’s capabilities pretty thin, potentially for a very long time.
Widespread destruction and large numbers of civilian deaths, likewise, tend to lead to long-term problems for those doing the destroying and killing; a lot of what Israel’s doing right now has echoes of the US’s period of lashing-out across the Middle East in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, and that led to a generation of “forever war” expenses and conflicts, while also giving birth to some of today’s most vehement anti-US (and anti-Western) forces.
In addition to the isolation Israel is facing from the international community because of its efforts in Gaza, then, the country could face decades of difficult relationships, massively inflated military and intelligence expenses (just to maintain the new status quo), and a whole generation of young people growing up amidst all the damage they’ve done and trauma they’ve caused (which can make governing and securing such regions difficult, but can also spawn new violent extremist groups that otherwise never would have existed).
In this way, a supposed short-term victory (or wave of such victories) can quickly become a long-term millstone around the neck of the victor. Having seen this play out (amongst their neighbors) before, there’s a chance Israel will opt for another tack, instead.
Israel has heavily invested in shadow-war assets that can allow it to operate with deniability while consistently degrading their opponents’ ability to function (militarily and otherwise).
There’s a good chance, then, that rather than launching some kind of formal, pitched battle against Iran, Israel will instead double-down on degrading their infrastructure, military assets, and nuclear capabilities covertly: hacking water systems, bombing electric grids, assassinating leaders, and so on.
Such a shadow war, combined with the rapid decommissioning of the Axis of Resistance, would restore Israel’s aura of invincibility (and accompanying “don’t mess with us” vibe) while also pulling things back from the brink, allowing everyone involved to engage in face-saving measures, which in turn would help establish a new, moderated tit-for-tat dynamic.
This may not be what Netanyahu wants (or for his political survival, needs), and it may not align with his party’s other ambitions (which include claiming land that’s currently “occupied territory”); it may be that a big, real-deal war is the only thing that will sate those currently in control of Israel’s government.
There’s a good chance we’ll know which general direction things will swing in the next few weeks, though, once Israel has the chance to respond to that most recent attack from Iran—at which point we’ll probably also have a better sense of just how deep into Lebanon Israel’s forces plan to go, and whether (and how) Israel’s enemies will mark the anniversary of those Oct 7 attacks, if they indeed decide to do so.
Thanks for reading! Please share your hellos, insights, counterpoints, and feedback in the comments or via email.
Wow! That AI podcast-enstein was kinda scary. Not sure if it’s good or bad scary. But wow.
Great bit of writing Colin. Looking forward to more!